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PEACE IS NOT PERPETUAL, AUTONOMOUS, OR RATIONAL 
Danielle Poe 
When I write about and teach Immanuel Kant, I am always im-
pressed and seduced by the beauty and neatness of his work. After 
all, Kant makes morality a science; answers are clear and distinct, 
black and white. Individuals make ethical decisions by using rea-
son according to universally accessible principles. People should 
do the right thing, not because it is easy, not because it makes 
them feel good, and not because they have been raised to do so. 
People should do the right thing because it is their duty, and they 
determine their duty by asking, "Can I universalize my action?" If 
yes, then the act is ethical and one's duty. If no, then the act is un-
ethical and not doing so is one's duty. This philosophy is deeply 
seductive because it affirms the possibility of doing the right thing 
even when doing the wrong thing is easier, safer, and tempting. 
The simplicity of this approach appeals to those of us with a com-
mitment to nonviolence in a highly militaristic society. People can 
ask themselves, "Can I will that everyone kill other people?" No, 
then military force is wrong regardless of how often it has been 
used and how entrenched it is in U.S. society. The moral person 
will reject violence even if she or he must stand alone. 
Kant further seduces philosophers of non-violence in Perpetual 
Peace when he lays out a practical plan for attaining perpetual 
peace, which for him is the cessation of war (Kant 1983). After 
laying out the Preliminary Articles and the Definitive Articles for 
perpetual peace, Kant assures the reader that "Taken objectively, 
morality is in itself practical, for it is the totality of unconditional-
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ly binding laws according to which we ought to act, and once one 
has acknowl dg d th authority of its con pt of duty, it would be 
utterly absurd to continue wanting to say that one cannot do his 
duty" (Kant 1983, 370). Thus, morality and peace do not depend 
upon subjective perspectives and imperfect contexts. Peac falls 
under the umbrella of objectiv - morality and unconditional laws. 
These laws include abolishing standing armies (Kant 1983, 345), 
prohibiting nations from forcibly interfering with other sover-
eign nation's constitutions and governments (Kant 1983, 345), 
and universal hospitality (Kant 1983, 357-358). I applaud each of 
these articles, and I admire that Kant turned his philosophical 
genius to thinking about ways to bring about peace. This paper, 
though, will defend a position that is both more radical and more 
practical than Kant's position. The position is more radical than 
Kant's because it requires perpetual, peaceful revolution that 
seeks justice rather than merely seeking the absence of war. The 
position is more practical because it considers the current U.S. 
conflict with Iran rather than universal ideals. 
At the center of Kant's ethics and political philosophy- and 
his philosophy in general-is a commitment to autonomy and ra-
ti~nality. For Kant autonomy and rationality are necessarily inter-
twined. After all, autonomy is" auto-nomos," giving oneself the law, 
and the law which we give ourselves is the law of reason, and what 
is reasonable is that which preserves autonomy. Autonomy and 
reason are mutually reinforcing. In his ethics, Kant arrives at the 
centrality of autonomy and reason by searching for a human 
good and rejecting other contenders. In the opening line of The 
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Moral,s, Kant uses reason to situate 
the good will at the heart of morality: "There is no possibility of 
thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which 
can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will' 
(Kant, 393). Material objects, personality traits, and intelligence 
are not good in themselves because each of these things may very 
well be used in such a way as to be harmful to oneself or others. 
The good will is the good of acting purely according to duty, not 
out of self-interest. Duty, in turn, is determined by universal ratio-
nality free of subjective considerations. 
In Perpetual Peace, the emphasis on autonomy and rationality 
manifests itself in the article that states, "No nation shall forcibly 
interfere with the constitution and government of another" 
(Kant, 346). The rationality that supports this principle is that 
nothing can justify such interference; although, Kant does stipu-
late that other nations can aid a country in which two factions are 
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vying for the whole country. Kant leaves no provision, though, for 
external countries to interfere in an internal genocide. The con-
sistent application or this principle would result in the onclusion 
that because the genocide is happening withiu the borders of 
~wanda, then other countries ought to respect Rwanda's sover-
e1gn ty. Any ot~er.conclusions ~ould require countries to appeal 
to concrete cntena developed m response to the particular di ·as-
ters that are possible today. 
While Kant's commitment to autonomy, universal rational laws, 
and perpetual peace appeals to philosophers' desire for systems 
that can respond to every situation, this system relies on static un-
derstandings of subjectivity, law, and peace. Philosophers might 
want a universal rule and duty that will require countries to re-
spond to genocide, but the world does not accommodate that 
desire. Instead, individuals develop communities, even as they de-
velop in response to their particular communities. A more prac-
tical approach to politics entails situating people within a con-
text. The political philosopher Chantal Mouffe offers such a de-
scription by describing how people develop their subjectivity in 
relation to other people, 
To be capable of thinking politics today, and understanding 
the nature of these new struggles and the diversity of social 
relations that the democratic revolution has yet to encom-
pass, it is indispensable to develop a theory of the subject as 
a decentered, detotalized agent, a subject constructed at the 
point of intersection of a multiplicity of subject positions be-
tween which there exists no a priori or necessary relation 
and whose articulation is the result of hegemonic practices. 
(Mouffe 1993, 12) 
Whereas Kant founds autonomy on a universal plane in which 
the moral subject is understood by and grounded in reason, 
Mouffe argues that a subject has no universal dimensi~·.m. Rather, 
subjectivity happens within a context of diverse practices among 
diverse groups. The practices and groups that make up an indi-
vidual's subjectivity are not determined by her or him; the prac-
tices and groups influence the individual and the individual in-
fluences the practices and groups, but no particular individual is 
the sole determiner of meaning. Morality, laws, and actions have 
their source and motivation within these contexts rather than in 
a purely objective realm. 
Another significant aspect of Mouffe's definition of subjectivi-
ty is that she gives up the Enlightenment emphasis on individual-
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ism: "It is necessary to theorize the individual, not as a monad, an 
"unencumbered" self that exists prior to and independently of so-
ciety, but rather as a site constituted by an ensemble of "subject 
positions," inscribed in a multiplicity of social relations, the mem-
ber of many communities and participant in a plurality of collec-
tive forms of identification" (Mouffe 1993, 97). Whereas Kant 
emphasizes a universal subject who makes decisions based on a 
formulation of universal laws, Mouffe emphasizes the situated-
ness of being a person. People do not make decisions outside of 
their situation and their situation provides the rules and the con-
text for what is acceptable and what is not acceptable. Moreover, 
people are part of many communities, each of which i~fluence.s 
their decisions, judgments, and abilities to act. Some subject posi-
tions come with power and influence. Other subject positions are 
marginalized, oppressed, and excluded from power. The self is 
always in these contexts; it does not first exist as a purely rational 
being. 
A concrete example of this can be illustrated by considering 
my own subject position, which is composed of being a woman, 
Caucasian, middle-class, a United States citizen, a Roman Cath-
olic, a feminist, a mother, a spouse, a teacher, a scholar, a daugh-
ter, a sister, and so on. To answer the question, "who am I?", I do 
not rely on some universal attribute shared by all humans since 
?-o. universal attribute exists that explains subjectivity. Subjectivity 
is mstead composed of the many overlapping, layered, and het-
erogeneous positions that I occupy in relation to other people. 
Now, consider the description that any other person might of-
fer to describe his or her subjectivity. One can imagine that in 
c.omparison to the description of my subjectivity other descrip-
t10ns could have significant overlap, some have very little overlap, 
~nd some have no overlap, but it is not possible to have an iden-
tICal subject description since each subjectivity is determined in 
part by relationships with particular people in addition to more 
encompassing groups. In the above description of subjectivity, 
each community is composed of people who are irreducible. 
T~at is, our communities are made up of people with differences. 
Within our communities, we organize ourselves and form collec-
tive identities. As Mouffe explains, "One of the crucial questions 
at stake is the creation of a collective identity, a 'we.' In the ques-
tion 'What shall we do?', the 'we' is not given but rather consti-
tutes a problem" (Mouffe 1993, 50). 
Creating a collective identity, a 'we,' happens in a context and 
as a process. 'We' might be a group of people who are opposed 
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to a particular war, such as the Vietnam War or the Iraq War. In 
another context, we might be a group of people who are opposed 
to all wars. The first "we" comes together in response to a partic-
ular event and will lose its collective identity after the event con-
cludes. The second "we" is likely to retain its collective identity 
much longer because it defines itself in opposition to an ideolo-
gy rather than to an event. That both of these examples come 
from groups who form their identities in opposition to other 
groups is significant. 'We' depends on a constitutive outside, 
those who are not like 'us.' How 'we' is defined, though, will 
change in different situations, and seeking justice means that we 
can never be satisfied with current condition . A society that val-
ues democracy, difference, and justice should reject Kant's per-
petual peace as an ideal. 
Peace is not perpetual because no permanent, static, ideal of 
peace can ever or should ever be reached. Peace is much more than 
a simple absence of conflict. Peace is the presence of just relations 
in the world. If peace were simply the absence of conflict, then 
peace could be maintained by the threat of violence, or by op-
pressed groups of people acquiescing in their oppression. Peace re-
quires that people recognize the dignity of other people, the inter-
connections between people and the world, and the value of diver-
sity in societies. In order to achieve peace, we must engage in what 
Emmanuel Levinas calls a "perpetual revolution." The perpetual 
revolution requires that we constantly re-evaluate the institutions 
that are responsible for maintaining justice in our society, guarding 
against the evil that can lurk in good intentions, and always look-
ing for new ways to include marginalized people and groups. 
As an example of the need for perpetual revolution, which 
guards against evil that taints the good, Levinas describes Stalin's 
communism, which begins with just intentions and becomes cor-
rupt by elevating an ideal above the worth of individual people. 
Stalin begins with a legitimate critique: people are suffering un-
der capitalism. He continues with a legitimate means of address-
ing suffering: a more just society requires that resources be held 
in common. Obviously, though, Stalin's initial good intentions 
led to widespread suffering, intolerance, and political tyranny be-
cause the ideals of communism were elevated above the lives of 
particular individuals (Burggraeve 2005, 86-90). For Levinas, 
every good idea, principle, and institution carries a similar risk. 
Even an institution and system that aims to alleviate suffering 
must be evaluated to ensure that no individual person is sacri-
ficed for a greater good. 
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Here, Levinas and Mouffe will agree to Kant's practical im-
perative: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of anoLhcr, always al Lh same 
time as an end and never simply as a means" ( 429). Some may 
accuse me of forfeiting my postmodern aims at this point because 
I am relying on a universal principle. The crucial distinction, 
though, between Kant's modern description of this imperative 
and my postmodern use of this imperative is Lhal for me a person 
can never be understood by any universal formula. For Kant, the 
practical imperative to never treat a person simply as a means but 
also as an end is derived from the universal d scription of people 
as rational beings. F r Levinas and Mouffc, th · impcrativ Lo 
never treat a person as an end is derived from the interconnec-
tion between people who live in particular contexts. For Kant, the 
implications of this imperative lead to universal rule of conducl. 
For Levinas and Mouffe, the implications of this imperative lead 
to particular acts determined within a context. Universalizing im-
peratives, refusing to consider challenge , and failing to account 
for particular differences carries the danger of sacrificing people 
to an ideal. 
Roger Burggraeve, one of Levinas' commentators, writes, "Real-
ized justice does not suffice; it is in constant need of correction, 
revision, and reform. Only in this way can it avoid petrifying its 
own ethical quality and suffocat[ing] in its own opposite . Only 
thus can it counter the transformation of the good into evil" 
(Burggraeve 2005, 84). From this perspective, justice is a project 
that begins in the relationships between individual people. How-
ever, Levinas recognizes that our obligations expand far beyond 
the people that we meet each day. Even among those we meet 
each day, we cannot always respond to the needs of each person. 
Thus, every society must have social and political systems and in-
stitutions that respond to the concrete n eds of people in a soci-
ety. But, it will never be the case that we have created a society 
that is sufficiently or completely just. As part of the nature of be-
ing human, our institutions are finit , or limit d . To maintain jus-
tice, we must continually question institutions. We must seek out 
those who have been excluded so that their voices can be heard 
and their needs can be met. 
In order to continually redefine who is included in 'we' and to 
bring those who are part of the constitutive outside into the polit-
ical process it is important to practice democracy throughout our 
society. As Mouffe states, "That is, we should proceed from the 
democratization of the state to the democratization of society; 
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the task is to struggle against autocratic power in all iL<; forms in 
order to infiltrate the various spaces still occupied by non-demo-
crati cent rs of power" (Mouffe 1993, 94). When Mouffe states 
that we should democratize so icty, she is making an important 
point. Power in a society is held in many places outside of formal 
politics. Yet, even in these places democracy is desirable. 
For Mouffe, democracy has a very specific meaning. First, it is 
founded on the liberal tradition of equality and liberty. Second, 
democracy has come to value and protect pluralism. Equality, lib-
erty, and pluralism are values that ground our current democra-
cy, but they are value that exist in tension. How do we protect 
gro~1ps' a.1~d individuals ' rights to I ursue thei1· own projects and 
d s~1- · wht~ ~lso making sure that their diversity is rcs1 · t d and 
their equality is not compromised? The challenge is to ontinual-
ly revise social and political institutions so that groups are not 
marginaliz d, but we also want to avoid a stifling consensus 
among groups. For Mouffe, too much consensus indicates apathy 
and a lack of pluralism and choices. (Mouffe 1993, 6) 
The dangers of too much consensus are evident in Burg-
graeve's reading of Levina in which vii shadows that which was 
initially good. The paradigmatic example of the good becoming 
evil for Levin.as is Stalin.ism. Stalinism began in a critique of cap-
italism, specifically a critique of the exploitation of the working 
poor by the rich owners of factories. However, Stalin.ism became 
evil as it elevated one system of distribution above all others, and 
this system became the Good. Once this system became the 
Good, it became possible to sacrifice individual people-political 
critics, artists, lawyers, intellectuals, anyone who might question 
the absolute authority of the system- to the overall good. 1:'h~s, 
an initial concern for the well-being of people is perverted 111 its 
attempt to install a permanent and unchanging system (Burg-
graeve 2005, 86-90) . 
Thus, for both Levinas and Mouffe a certain amount of con-
sensus is necessary and d sirable in order to accomplish just pro-
jects, but too much consensus leads to stagnation, which under-
mines any possibility for forming a just society Just as it was nec-
essary to constantly define and evaluate who "we" ar , societies 
must also define and evaluate who "they" are. Mouffe defines 
"they" in two ways: those who have different perspectives but play 
by the same political rules and those who refuse even the politi-
cal rules by which we operate. The U.S. political divide between 
republicans and democrats illustrates the first category of those 
who have different ideas but are within the same political con-
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text. Republicans and democrats run for political offices on dif-
ferent political platforms. During this process, Americans expect 
to hear different ideas about how to manage social problems 
such as poverty, healthcare, and education. U.S. citizens vote in 
order to choose one set of ideas over another. The differences 
that candidates manifest help to keep democracy vibrant, and a 
lack of distinction between the candidates and their ideas under-
mines the democratic process. After the election, both sides 
abide by the decisions reached in the process. 
For example, Al Gore and George W. Bush ran for president in 
2000. Gore and Bush mapped out very different visions for the 
U.S. A majority of people voted for Gore, but Bush won the votes 
in the Electoral College and decisions of the Supreme Court to 
become president. Gore continues to give a very different per-
spective than the one offered by Bush, but both remain commit-
ted to the election process. As Mouffe states, "One should not 
hope for the elimination of disagreement but for its containment 
within forms that respect the existence ofliberal democratic insti-
tutions" (Mouffe 1993, 50). Disagreement provides an opportu-
nity for choice, provides critiques of unjust institutions, and illu-
minates new paths to pursue justice. Problems develop when dis-
agreement becomes antagonism such that disagreement be-
comes violent or prevents any action . 
While disagreement between groups is desirable in the proper 
context, another division exists between groups within a liberal, 
democratic context and groups who refuse this context. This dis-
tinction is the friend and enemy distinction. Another group be-
comes an enemy rather than "they" when the group operates out-
side the rules by which "us" and "them" play and when the group 
defines itself in opposition to the identity of us and them (Mouffe 
1993, 2-3). For this paper, "enemy" will define those whose 
actions threaten the flourishing of other groups. Many philoso-
phers argue that the friend/ enemy distinction can be overcome. 
For some, friend/enemy is overcome by distinguishing between 
people and their beliefs or actions in order to fight the actions 
but not the person. This approach is especially helpful in adher-
ing to the imperative to treat all people as end-in-themselves. 
Gandhi follows this approach when he cites the Christian imper-
ative to, "Hate the sin and not the sinner" (Fischer 2002, 83). 
From this perspective, action against injustice, violence, and op-
pression is aimed at both the oppressed and the oppressor. Ideal-
ly, the nonviolent action will convert the oppressor and free the 
oppressed. Others argue that the distinction between friend and 
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enemy should be overcome through political institutions that 
transform antagonisms into agonistic politics. Theorists of ago-
nistic politics reason that people will always divide themselves 
into diverse groups with conflicting interests and ideas that will 
transform into violent conflict unles proc sses and institutions 
are in place tor solve the conni ts. Th r ' 'Olution will f How the 
~xampl that I outlined above: ociety will ad I l one side's be-
liefs, ideas, and policies, but the different ideas will still exist to 
challenge and reform current institutions. 
. My own position is that the friend and enemy distinction is as 
Irresolvable as the us and them distinction. The challenge is to 
address the split between friend and enemy with nonviolent ac-
tions. In this context, enemy refers to those who oppose another 
group's beliefs, ideas, and actions and refuse to participate in 
institutions in which those differences could be resolved. While 
Gandhi's affirmation of separating others' identities from their 
beliefs helps to maintain the focus on all people's humanity, it 
fails to recognize that people are known through their words and 
actions. A deeper sense of identity does not manifest itself politi-
cally. While one group might refuse to use the term enemy to 
describe another group, the friend/ enemy distinction is already 
in place if one of the groups applies the description to the other. 
Martin Luther King,Jr.'s d s ription of the biblical imperative 
to "love your enemy" helps to focus on how the friend/ enemy dis-
tinction can focus nonviolent practices. King's description begins 
with a distinction similar to Gandhi's distinction between the per-
son and her or his actions. King writes that one should love "the 
person who does an evil deed while hating the deed that the per-
son does. I think that this is what Jesus meant when he said 'love 
your enemies."' His next words, though, make clear that even if 
King makes a distinction between a person and her or his actions, 
the group that he is struggling against is not using such a distinc-
tion. King writes, "I'm very happy that he didn't say like your ene-
mies, because it is pretty difficult to like some people. Like is sen-
timental, and it is pretty difficult to like someone bombing your 
home; it is pretty difficult to like somebody threatening your chil-
dren; it is difficult to like congressmen who spend all of their 
time trying to defeat civil rights" (Washington 1986, 46-4 7) . 
Those who bomb homes, threaten children, and refuse civil 
rights to otl1ers view those against whom they commit violence as 
enemies. King cannot control the understanding that this other 
group has of him and other African-Americans, but he can control 
his response and he can ref·use to cooperate with these enemies. 
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Many people believe that people such as King and Gandhi 
were heroes and charismatic leaders but nonviolence has no rel-
evance in today's violent world. This skepticism about nonvio-
lence reflects a belief in much of what has been stated. People 
think nonviolence cannot work because they believe that local 
conditions determine what can and cannot be effective; they do 
not believe that universal rules of reason and morality exist or are 
effective. Further, people believe that enemies exist. In our own 
global situation, I would suggest that we determine the catego~ies 
of friend and enemy by working through international organiza-
tions. Two examples of documents already in place to fra~e 
these discussions are the United Nations' Universal Declarat10n 
of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions. Both of these 
documents were created through wide consultation with coun-
tries from around the world and endorsed by countries from 
around the world. These documents draw out very clear stan-
dards for acceptable and unacceptable conduct, and they do so 
without reference to static, universal principles. 
Although treaties and declarations exist, others violate the stan-
dards that these documents put forth. Those who violate the stan-
dards. are enemies, but those violations can be upheld witho~t 
resorung to war. One of the most persuasive articulations of this 
point comes from the work of David Cortright who is the Presi?ent 
of Fourth Freedom Forum, a Research Fellow at the Kroc Institute 
for International Peace at the University of Notre Dame, the 
author of Gan.dhi and Beyon_d: Nonviol,ence for an Age of Terrorism 
(2006), and, with Howard Zmn, the author of Soldier in Revolt: GI 
~esistanceD.uring the ~ietnam ~ar (2006). Cortright has offered ??n-
violent opuons for withdrawing from Iraq without comprom1s111g 
U.S. security, for confronting global terrorism, and for opposing 
Iran's aspirations to have nuclear weapons (Cortright 2003, 11-
13; Cortright 2004, 14-17; Cortright 2005, 62-64; Cortright 2005, 
7-7; Cortright 2006, 12-14; Cortright 2006, 18-22; Cortright 2006, 
24-27; Cortright 2006, 7-7; Cortright and Lopez 2004, 30). 
As democrats and republicans seem intent on beating the war 
drums to gather support to invade Iran, I will focus on Cortright's 
arguments that non-military strategies will be more effective than 
a military invasion to keep Iran within the constraints of the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that it has signed. At this 
point, Iran is in compliance with the NPT. Cortright's argument 
has seven points. First, the U.S. ought to work with the United 
Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency to encour-
age Iran to give up building nuclear weapons. Two, the U.S. 
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should focus on keeping Iran in the NPT. This will keep inspec-
tors in Iran; these inspectors will find traces of activity long before 
Iran can develop weapons. Nuclear technology leaves dramatic 
radioactive traces in soil and in the water that inspectors can eas-
ily find. Third, the U.S. needs to engage in a diplomatic surge, 
instead of a military surge. This would entail a summit between 
the U.S. and Iran with no preconditions. Fourth, the U.S. could 
offer incentives rather than threats. Iran has billions of dollars in 
the U.S. that has been frozen since 1979. This money could be 
turned over to non-state entities. Sanctions could be lifted; open 
exchange could be implemented. Fifth, the U.S. could offer a e-
curity assurance by pledging not to use military force against 
Iran. Sixth, the U.S. can connect diplomatic efforts in Iran to 
NPT efforts in the Middle East in order to create a zone free of 
weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the U.S. could take force off 
the table completely and pledge to work through diplomatic 
means (Cortright 2006, 24-27; 2006, 7; 2007). 
When this paper began, I noted that Kant's philosophy appeals 
to me by virtue of its philosophical neatness: answers are clear, 
rational, and universal. Throughout the paper, I have argued that 
the world does not operate in such a way as to accommodate 
clear, universal answers that will be binding on all rational peo-
ple. To quote Jean-Francois Lyotard from 17ie Postmodern Condi-
tion, "But our incredulity is now such that we no longer expect sal-
vation to rise from these inconsistencies ... " (Lyotard 1984, xxiv) . 
The complexity and diversity of the world is such th~t people may 
choose to act in ways that they clearly would not wish to be urn-
versalized, and they may choose to believe in rights even though 
they have no universal ground from which these rights can be 
derived or from which others can be convinced to respect these 
rights. These truisms do not indicate a position of despair; rather, 
they indicate that people must continually define what they mean 
by democracy, rights, equality, justice, and peace. The process of 
defining these terms requires that people disagree, argue, and 
defend diverse definitions in order to produce definitions that 
will include people and groups who have been marginalized and 
reflect the needs of a particular context. 
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